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Pensions may contribute to male/female or black/white inequality to the
extent that white males are more likely to receive pensions than are other
groups. Conditional on receiving pensions, the value of pension benefits
varies because white males have the highest level of expected tenure at
retirement. By using a combination of the Current Population Survey and the
l9SOBnker's Trust Corpprate Pension Plan Study, we find that the existence
of pension plans contributes to black/white inequality but leaves male/female
inequality unchanged among whites, Even though females are less likely to
receive pensions than males, those females whodoreceive pensions enjoy
generous ones, Among blacks, pensions exacerbate sex differences because
black women are only about 75% as likely to receive pensions as black males.
Edward P. Lazear Sherwin Rosen
GraduateSchool of Business Dep:rtment of Economics
University of Chicago University of Chicago
1101East 58th Street 1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL60637 Chicago, IL 60637Much attentionhas been given to earnings inequality in recentyears.
Although most agree that the variable of interest is lifetime wealthrather
than current earnings,1 there has beenrelatively little study of differences
in non-wage and salary components of earnings.Pension inequality is
interesting for a number of reasons: First, pensionsare a large fraction of
total. non-wage compensation. Second, there have beenrecent changes in laws
that regulate sex—based differences in pension benefits.Third, private
pensions have grown in importance over time andmaybecome even more important
in the future.
What follows is an attempt to determine whetherpensions exacerbate
compensation inequality across groups•Thereare two aspects to this issue.
The first is that the probability of receivinga pension may not be random
across groups. For example, in Lazeer (1979), RetirementHistory Survey data
revealed that 49%ofthe workers in the sample had pension plancoverage, but
blacks were 6.6% less likely to be covered than whites.Similarly, female
coverage was 8.6% less than males. Theee patterns are investigated inmore
detail in the CPS data below. The secondaspect is how the size of pensions
varies with sex and race of people who are eligibleto receive them. This is
more difficult to determine and is the main focus of thisstudy.
There are two empirical tasks before us. The first isto determine the
characteristics of the average retiree in each sex andrace group. Especially
important is the average tenure, age, and salary of thetypical retiree
because pension amounts in most plans dependon these variables. The second
'E.g.,see are Lillard (1976), Rosen (1977), Lazear(1979a),andLillard and Willis(1978).task is to estimate the pension that each groups typical retiree receives,
This depends on the plan in which he is enrolled so it is necessary to use
somerepresentative sample of plans.
The May1979Consumer Population Survey is used for the first task, This
was chosen over the Retirement History Survey because of the emphasis in this
study on male/female and black/white comparisons, The coverage of females in
the Retirement History Survey is non—representative, whereas the CPS has a
better cross—section of the relevant population. For the second task, a data
set that was constructed by Lazear (1983) was used, It is based on the
Bankers Trustrporate Pension PlanStudy (1980), covering about 200 plans,
Age, Tenure and Salary of the Typical Retiree
The 1979 CPS was used to impute the average age, tenure and salary of the
typical retiree in four race/sex categories, This task was less than
straightforward because the relevant information is not reported in an
appropriate form, Since the CPS is a cross—section, the date of retirement,
and therefore age, tenure, and salary at thedateof retirement are not known
for the group of individuals who are currently working. For the individuals
whohave already retired, neither tenure nor final salary on their career (or
even last) job is reported, Thus, it is necessary to devise a method that
estimates the requisite information from the cross—section,
Theidea is to examine differentcohorts and to infer from the distribu-
tion of individuals across retirement and employment—tenure classes what the
retirement age and tenure must have been, using a variant of synthetic cohort
analysis,The following example illustrates the basic ideas,
Supposewe are interested inthe average level of tenure at retirement
forsome group and that only three age groups are relevant: No one retiresbefore age 55, some retire at ages 55 and 56, and all are retired by age 57.
Thecross—section has workers andretirees at each ages So let us stratify
thesample by age, None age 55 are retired, and their tenure on the current
job is reported. Suppose that half have tenure of 20 years arid half have
tenureof 30 years. Although we cannot observe what happens to these
individuals over the next year, we can examine the individuals who are
currently 56 years old, In a steady state those individuals are identical to
thecurrent group of 55—year—olds, except thatthey are one yearolder,
Suppose that half of the 56—year—olds are retired and of those whocontinueto
work,three fourths have tenure of 21 years, whereas only one fourth have
tenure of 31 years.That implies that three fourths of those whoretired
before age 56 did so with 30 years of tenure and one fourth did so with 20
years of tenure. Thus, (1/2)(3/4)3/8 of the population retire at age 55
with 30 years of tenure, Similarly, (1/2)(1/4)1/8 retire at age 55 with 20
years of tenure, Since all workers are retired by 57, it follows that
(1/2)(3/4) 3/8 of the labor force retire at age 56 with 21 years of tenure
and that (1/2)(1/4) =1/8of the labor force retire at age 56 with 31 years of
tenure, Given this information it is easy to calculate the expected level of
tenureat retirement. In this case, it is
(3/8)30 +(1/8)20+(3/8)21+(1/8)31=25,5years *
Theactual procedure is more complicated because there are manymore age
and tenure categories and because some workers take new jobs and oth'rs die.
Butthe basic idea is the same. The procedure is applied to fourgroups:
white males, white females, black males, and black females. The subset of the
CPS sample analyzed consists of individual who reported themselves either as
retired, or as currently working with valid information on job tenurt, and whowere from 55 to 76 years old,2 The CPS reports whether individuals whoare
workingare enrolled in a pension plan, We restricted the sample to those who
were enrolled because there are large differences in employment status,
tenure, and salary levels by pension enrollment.3
The next few pages begin with some definitions and describe the method
usedin more detail, Theestimates are based on a counting algorithm and
steadystateassumptions. Define marginal counts
N(a,i): number of workersinthecross-seetionof age a
who have i years of tenure,
N(aR): number age a who are retired,
and transition counts
numberof age a with tenure i who will have jyears
oftenure next year.
numberofage awith tenure i who retire
during theyear.
Ignoring unemployment, for transitions we have, for i > 1either:
(1) jI+1:ifthe person remains on job
(2)j= 1 ifthe person turns over and obtains a new job
(3)j ifthe person retires between years.
Finallydefine:
2We ignore those who retire earlier than 55 because it is likely that
only a very small numberof workers with pensions retire before age 55,
3Forexample, not enrolled black women earn anaverage of $3,471 per
year, whereas enrolled blackwomenearn$10,206.—6—
ND(asi): number aged a and tenure iwhodiebefore age a +1.
The following accounting identities apply in a state state:
N(a,S) —Ni+iCa,i)+N1Ca,i)+NRCai)+ND(ai)
Aperson must go to one of the four mutually exclusive and exhaustive
classifications. Further
N(a+1,i+1) aNi+i(a,i)
Personsfound with one more year of tenure in the following year must be those
who transited to that state between years. And
N(a+1, 1) aN1(a,i)+N1(a,R) i
People with one year of tenure are those who changed jobs or who came out of
retirement. Similarly
N(a+1,1) a ENR(ai) + i
Thoseobserved retired in the next year either transited to that state during





We seekto estimate NR(a,i).Both N(a,i) andN(a+1,i+1) are observed in
thecross—section data. However, no data are available fran a cross-section
on transitions N1(.,.) or tj(,4, so someassumptions are required to
impute them.
Let P(a,i)bethe probability that a worker aged a with tenure i
takes anewjob and transits to state i a1.Include A in the set U).Then
N1(a,i) P(a,i)N(a,i)
so
(2) N(a+1, 1)E N1(a,i) I P(a,i)N(a,i)
Ifthere are A age groups andT tenure classes (2)representsA —1
equationsin (AUT unknowns P(a,i). The marginal counts N(a,i) are not
sufficientto estimate P(a,i) (and therefore N1(a,i)) without additional
restrictions on P(a,iU We know from other studies4 that P is decreasing
in i and probably in a as welL Th make things simple and computationally










where R =1if theperson is retired andR =0if not,
Define N(a) I N(a,i) as the working population of age a and
i in
N(a,R),,asbefore, as those retired. Then, substituting for P(a,i) in (2)
and summing yields





Treat (3Yis a regression equation, in which the observed counts N(a+1, 1)
areregressed on observed variables N(a), aN(a),..,etc.acrossage
groups. There are eight unknown parameters in this regression, so if A > 9,
this regression can he estimated.
ee Mincer and Jovanovic (1981)—8-
In our data A a21,so there are only 13 degrees of freedom. There-
fore, the individual parameters (a, ,1,6) are not estimated precisely.
In addition same of the regressors are colinear. Nevertheless, we get
unbiased estimates(a,i). From these we obtain unbiased estimates of
N1Ca,i), from
i1(a,i) ai(a,ihfla,i)
Asimilar procedure works in general for estimatesof N,0(a,i). However,
we find that the data are too thin to obtain meaningful results for the rela—




where P*(a) is the 1979 age—specific death rate for thisrace—sexclass, we
know that there is a strong negativeassociationbetween work and deathso
j(a,R)is likely to be biased from this procedure. The biases withrespect
to i are less clear cut,though itis probable that %(a,i) for large i
is upwardbiased,since people who are currently working andwith longtenure
arelikelyto be healthier than average.
From the identity above, NR(a,i) is estimated from
(4) N(ari) aN(a,i)—N(a+1,i+1) —11(a,i)
—ND(ali)
Now £Lja.i) is the total number of people aged a who retire and
i
£E N(ai) is the total number who retire in the whole population at any age.
ai
Therefore,
(5) n(a) a£N (a,i)/EE %(ai) iR
is the probability of retiring at age a, giventhatdeath does notoccur
prior to retirements and(6) 1an(a)E(age of retirement) Ea
Similarly,S N(a,i) is the number of people who retire after i years of
tenure,so
(7) mCi)L N(ai)/EE N(ai)
isthe conditional probability of retiring at tenure i given that death
occurs after retirement,
Theref ore
(8) Ei =E(tenureat retirement) =Sim(i)
i
Before turning to the estimates, some qualifications are in order.
1If ND is biased upward for larger i, then there is a downward
bias in m(i) for large i(and upward bias in m(i) for small i).
Therefore Ei is probably biased down on this account, However, this source
of bias is likely to be small,
2. Even though the estimates of N(a, i) are no doubt imprecise, the
usual sampling theory suggests that E(a) and E(i) are better measures than
any of their components, through the law of large numbers, Now if the pension
formulas were .linear in a and i, these means are sufficient statistics for
our problem. However, these schemes are not linear, Therefore in predicting
expected pensions and pension wealth from each plan, It would be preferable to
take weighted averages across (a,i) pairs rather than taking the outcone for
the average persona The preferred alternative is simply not feasible with
these data,
3, The imputation procedure assumes no cohort effects, This is dictated
by a croscsection since it is well known that cohort and age effects cannot
l:o identif ted in a cross secton except through arb trary assumptlons .The—10—
formulas above make the strong steady state assumption that foraa'
people who attain age a' at (a' —a)periods in the future will behave was
if people age a' are behaving today (1979).
We know that the age of retirement has shown a secular decline for males
in the post—World War XX period. Increasing wealth, changes in tax laws and
in the Social Security system as well as changes in family composition andyet
other factors are all contributory causes. If thess trends continue then
E(a) is likely to be smaller in the future than our estimate: Theaverage age
of retirement for older cohorts in our sample was surely larger thanour
estimate. al the other hand, those issues are reversed for females, given the
large increase in female labor force participation in recent decades. Since
our estimates for females are conditioned on working, it is probable that
cohort bias of this sort is far less important for women than formen.
The influence of cohort effects on expected tenure is less clear-cut.
There are little data on secular changes in tenure on which to basean a
priori Judgment. If retirement continues to occur atyounger ages this is
likely to reduce tenure at retirement as well •However,the relation between
age and tenure is noisy, so though there may be cohort bias in E(i)
qualitatively similar to that of E(a), it is likely to be quantitatively
smaller. thanging labor force behavior of women andconditioning on labor
force participants again makes these considerations lessimportant for women;
if anything, the cohort bias for women tends togo in the opposite direction
than for men.
4. This procedure is based on actual counts in theeps tape for N(a,i).
Ifall cohorts were the samesize,and ifsample data reflected this exactly,
then,on the usual synthetic cohort assumptions,everything works out
correctly. However, some adjustmentsare necessary if either birth cohorts—11—
vary in size (which they do), or if sample sizes vary randomly with age. The
following approach, which is incorporated into the calculations, corrects the
problem
DefineN(a) as the total number of individuals in the sample of age a.
We normalize everything in terms of N(55), If this were a panel, then the
difference between N(55) and N(56) reflects only deaths during the year.
But in our synthetic panel, N(56) may deviate from N(55) because of real
differences in cohort sizes or random sampling differences across age groups.
However, death rates are known with accuracy, so an estimate of the corrected
age 56 sample can be easily obtained, In fact, P*(a), defined above, does
exactlythat, Thus, as an initial condition set
A *
N(56)=N(55)t1—P(55)3
Then the following recursion applies for a >56
A A *
N(a)=N(a13(1—P(a1))
The ratio of N(a)/N(a)1(a) reflects random samplingsize or cohort size
differences,Thcorrectour estimates for these factors,it isnecessary only
todivide all NR(ai) by A(a), Then eqs. (5)—(S) follow as written,
This discussion points to another possible source of bias that we have
ignored,nonretirement transitions out of thelabor force, This is likely to
lead to relatively small error for the aged population we study here because
these transitions are relatively minor among older workers,
5.In the data actually used we identify 21 age classes, a =55,
75, and 54 tenure classes, i =1,..,54.Since the sample consists of
some I,600+persons, many of: the N(a, i) cells are very small, and many are
empty. Thdealwith this problem we aggregated across tenure intervals and-1 2—





After inspection of the raw cells, eleven such sums were defined for each
age: I (1); 12 (2,6); 13 (7,11), 14 (12,16), 15 =(17,21),16
(22,26), 17(27,31), I (32,36), 19(37,41), 110(42,47), I
(48,54), after inspection of the raw cells. Define I, as the midpoint in
years of the ith i interval.
We fit the regression




to the aggregated data for purposes of smoothing and interpolation. The
variables B for black, F for female, and D for iI are dunnües.
Then
NR(ali)
+ + + b3i÷ b4i2 +b5ia
was used to calculate the distributions n(a) and m(i) used for our
estimates of Ei and Ear above. Appendix A reports the regression in (9).




White Male 62.1 22,0 $17,970
Female 63.2 21.8 11,414
Black Male 63.0 15.3 13,194
Female 65.9 16,8 10,754—13—
Expectedage of retirement of persons covered by private pensions is
remarkably uniformacross race andsex groups, Remember that these numbers
are conditioned on labor force participants as well as pension eligibility.
r1iSexplainsthe lack of appreciable differences between males and females.
While older females are far less likely to participate in labor market
activity then males, t:hose that do participate show similar average retirement
ages to men, In fact, EaR is slightly larger for women. Since estimated
is close to the early retirement age under Social Security, the somewhat
larger value for women may reflect known smaller coverage and experience under
Social Security than for men. The somewhat larger difference between black
males and females may be due to these same factors, as well as to the fact
that labor force participation of black men has historically exceeded that
of white women. Whatever factors affect these differences in participation
rates apparently also makes black women retire later in life,
The most surprising result in table 1 refers to the sex and race differ-
ences in expected tenure at retirement. For whiteswe find that expected
tenure on the job heldat retirement is virtually the same between the sexes
and is a remarkably long 22 years in length. As a check, this estimate is
similar to average tenure levels for those still working in the CPS data,
Recentwork onjob tenure patterns for males shows a characteristic pattern
thatmost job mobility occurs atyoungerages. By middle age most job
mobility thatwilloccurover alifetime hasalreadytaken place, soit isnot
surprising that forthe o:Lder male workers in our samplethe average tenure at
retirement is22.0 years, The result for women seems surprising at first
glance, but is less so when it isrecalled that these calculations refer to
working womenat age 55 and oider The estimatereflects the fact that a
significant number of women are not only permanently attached to the labor—14—
force but also to their place of work, either through their whole careers or
certainly subsequent to re—entry into the labor market after child—bearing
years.
Thesesimilarities between sexes are apparent among blacks as well as
whites in table 1. However, the difference between the races is substantial.
Taken at face value, these differences must reflect much greater job mobility
among older blacks than among older whites, While there is some evidence that
job and labor market instability is larger for blacks than for whites at
younger ages, are unaware of confirming evidence on these differences
between races among older workers. It should be noted in this connection that
our sample is much smaller for blacks than for whites, and the individual
N(a,i) cells are correspondingly thinner. Hence, the smoothness procedures
used and described above may ultimately account for these differences:
Certainly any confidence interval on these estimates would be much larger for
blacks than for whites, based on sampling variation alone, In fact, the
results for blacks are sensitive to the specification of equation (9), which
causes us concern, This fact must be borne in mind when interpreting the
black/white differences below, Still, there is nothing in the procedure used
that would by itself produce this point estimate and the similarity between
black men and black women is not automatically implied by our method.
The last bit of information necessary to perform the simulations is the
final salary at time of retirement, since many plans are geared to these
figures. The estimate is based on a standard earnings regression for each
race/sex group of the form:
(10) Earningsc0 +c1a+c2a2+c3i+c4i2÷ u
where the Cs6areregression parameters and u isregression errors After—15—
fitting this equation for each age—sex group, the estimated average salary fr
the average person is estimated by evaluating it at a — andi —EiR.
The regressions are contained in Appendix A. The earnings estimates are shown
in the third column of table 1, labeled.ES.5
The salary regression does not include the usual elaborate list of
controls such as education, marital stAtus, occupation, and the like because
we are not particularly interested iii this study of the partial effects of
such variables •Hencethe coefficients on the. age and. tenure variables cap-
ture the effects of variations in these other variAbles that are correlated
with age and tenure. This is conceptually appropriate for our purposes
becausedesire an estimate of mean fnal salary for eaSt race—sex gràup
over all education, occupation, industry, p4 marital àtatus classes. A more
elaborate regression would require reweightiag these other effects by relative
sample proportions: The regression above is self—weighting in this reipect and
is sufficient for the problem at head. Also, the regression has been
specified in terms of earnings levels rather thin the usual log of earnings.
A log transform is known to provide a better fit when All age groups are
included in the sample, but there is no compelling reason for using thAt
transform for the older people in our sample tirice it Is well known thAt much
of the curvature in life-cycle earnings patterS odcurs at younger ages.
Furthermore, it is the level and not the log of eatnings that is relevant for
pension determination, so we also avoid the questionable 0u correction for
error variance in transforming the log to the leivel by thu procedure.
5Note that although theearnings regressions are imprecise, the estimates
derived f rem them and used in table 1 are close to the unconditional mean for
each group.—16—
The percentage differences between white men and women at EaRandEiR
intable 1conform to the percentage differences in earnings found in the
populationas a whole. This is rather surprising because thewomeninour
sample exhibit the samemeanage ofretirementand tenure at retirement as men
do, andit isgenerally thought that theraw difference in earnings between
men and women in the population at large is related in some way to differences
in labor force activity over the life cycle. No doubt many of the women in
our sample re—entered the market after child—bearing. Whatever the case, they
never caught up with the men. This is both surprising and worthy of more
detailed investigation. The same relative pattern is repeated among blacks,
but at a much lower level.
One final qualification is necessary concerning these salary estimates.
The salary observations are censored by the retirement decision itself, Thus
the older individuals in the sample who were working found it in their
interest not to retire because their wage prospects were evidently larger than
their opportunity cost of leisure, People who continue to work are generally
healthier than average and many have superior earnings prospects, so the
observed wages of older—than—average workers in our sample is likely to be
larger than the wage prospects available to workers of these ages who chose
notto work, Therefore expected salary at age of retirement calculated above
probablyis too large for the average worker.
Pension Values ical Retirees
Given the information in table 1, the pension of these typical retirees
can be calculated from information on pension benefit formulas. The informa-
tion used comes from a data set generated by Lazear (1983). A description
follows:—17—
The data for Lazears analysis were constructed using the Bankers Trust
Corporate Pension Plan Study (1980) The study consists of a detailed verbal
description of the pension plans of over 200 of the nations largest corpora—
tions, The data set applies to approximately 10 millionworkers,and this
comprisesabout one—fourth of the entire covered population. The major
empirical task was to convert the verbal descriptions into machine—readable
data, This required Setting up a coding system that was specific enough to
capture all of the essential detail associated with each plan. It was then
necessary to write a program which calculates the present value of pension
benefits at each age of retirement,
Pension benefit formulas are of three different types. The twomost
commonfall under the rubric of defined—benefit plans, which specifies the
pensionflow as a fixed payment determined bysome formula, The patte
awardsthe recipient a flat dollar amount per year worked prior to retirement,
The conventional plan calculates the pension benefitflowfrom a formula which
depends upon years of service and some average or final salary. In contrast
tothe defined—benefit plans are defined—contribution plans in which the
employer (or employee) contributes a specified amount each year during work
lifeto a pension fund, Theflowof pension benefits that the worker receives
upon retirement is a function of the market value of that fund,Thedefined—
contributionplan is much less frequently used than is eithe.r thepattern plan
orconventional plan, Only defined—benefit plans are used here,
Some plans do not permit the individual to receive early retirement
benefits or oniy permit early retirement up to a given number ofyears before
the normal date, This means that in order to perform thenecessary compari-
sons,some plans hadto be deleted because age or tenure values in table 1
violatedrestrictions of the plan, Less than 15% of plans were deleted for
this reason,—18—
Hostplans have restrictions on the maximum amount which can be accrued,
and many provide for minimum benefits. Additionally, a number reduce pension
benefits by some fraction of the social security benefits to which some basic
class is entitled, Moreover, a number of plans provide supplements fat
retirement before the social security eligibility age. Sometimes these
supplements relate directly to social security payments; at other times they
depend upon the individual's salary or benefit level. Other restrictions have
to do with vesting requirements, with the maximum age at which the individual
begins employment, and with the minimum number of years served before the
basic accrual or particular supplements are applicable. The accrual rate, or
flat dollar amount per year to which the individual is entitled, is often a
nonlinear function of tenure and salary, and these kinks had to be programmed
intothe calculations,
Thispermits computation of the flow of retirement income in each of
these plans, for each of the four typical workers, To get present values of
the pension flows, a 10% discount factor was used, Finally, in performing the
actuarial correction, it was necessary to choose a life table, The 1979 U.S.
Vital Statistics tables were used, The choice of table turns out to be the
least crucial part of the analysis. Values do not vary greatly from year to
year and discounting makes unimportant whatever small differences there are
among tables.
Each of ourfour typical individuals was runthrough 172 of the plans for
whichqualificationcriteria were met, The expected present value of
retirement benefits (in date of retirement dollars) was estimated far each of
those individuals in each of the plans. Table 2 provides some summary
statistics on the results of that simulation,•—19—
Table2
PensionPresent Value for Typical Retiree (All Pensions) —_____
Expected
an Pens ion S td Max Me d Mi n
White Males $30,284 $18,412 $17,860$142,111 $28,422 $862
White Females 23,527 11,340 11,152 87,193 22,000 833
Black Males 17,396 9,550 9,545 78,342 16,067 833
Black Females 15,997 6,558 8,771 59,723 15,105 740
Note: N =172
*Expected pension is defined as the raw probability (from table 6) times
the mean pension.
Table 3
Pension Present Value for Typical Retiree
Defined—Benefit Pattern Plans
----
Group Mean Std,Dev, Max Med Mm
White Males $23,277 $6,822 $40,483 $23,724 $4,486
White Females 22,318 6,502 39,105 22,459 4,333
Black Males 15,067 4,280 26,612 15,000 13,750
Black Females 15,110 4,285 26,817 15,105 3,110
Note: N =48
Table 4
Pension Present Value for Typical Retiree
Defined—Benefit Conventional Plans
—••--- 9jeanStdDcv, Max Med Mm
White Males $32,991 $20,042 $142,111 $31,264 $862
White Females 24,032 12,520 87,193 22,000 833
Black Males 18,260 10,833 78,342 16,523 833




Pension Values and Final Salary *
Expected Final
AllPatternConventionalPenSion(ALL)S
White female/white male .776 .958 .728 .615 .635
Black male/white male .574 .647 .553 .518 .734
Black female/white female .679 .677 .680 .578 .942
Black female/white male .9191.002 .894 .687 .815
Black male pattern/white male conventional .456
Black female pattern/white female conventional =.628
Table 6
Probability of Participation in a Private Pension Plan
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Constant 1,559 .121









There are a number of interesting findings that come from this analysis,
Let us turn first to the question that was posed at the outset, namely, does
pension wealth exacerbate inequality? Recall that there are two aspects to
the question, The first relates to the probability that a worker in a given
demographic category has a pension; the second regards the expected pension
value for pension plan participants. The first was investigated by using the
CPS data to estimate a linear probability model, in table 6 the dependent
variable is a dummy equal to 1 if theindividual in question participates in a
privatepension plan, The sample consists of all working individuals between
55 and 76 years old with tenure reported.
A look at the coefficients in table 6 makes it appear as if blacks and
females do not differ from white males in terms of their probabilities of
participation in a pension plan. (Both coefficients are essentially zero.)
Appearances are decieving because earnings are held constant. Earnings have a
strong positive associationwith pensions,and sinceblacks and females have
lower earnings than white males, most of the difference can be accounted for
by differences in earnings. Wh:iie women and blacks who earn the same wages as
white males are likely toenjoy the same pension participationstatus, women
andblacks are unlikely to earn the same amount as white men,
The more important statistic for this analysis is therawprobability of
participationin a pension plan Those probabilities are reported in table 6
as well, White males have the highest probability of participating in a
pension plan while other groups, especially black women, aresubstantially
behind.Theseprobabilities will play animportantrole in the subsequent
discussion.—22—
'lbexamine the second question,namelyhowdopensions vary among
participants by race and sex, we call on the information in tables2-5.
First, comparethefirst and last columns of table 5.
The first columnreports theratio of pension value means fromtable2
for therelevant group so that the first entry is 23,527/30,284. The fifth
column reportsthe ratio of salarymeans fromtable1so the first entry is
11,414/17,970.
First consider black males and white males. The second rowoftable 5 is
relevant. Note that the ratio of the mean salary at retirement for these
groups is .734 andthat theratio of pension benefits is .574. If workers
were distributed randomly across the plans (which they are not), thenthe
existence of pensions wouldtendto increase black/white male inequality.
This is true for two reasons. First, as reported earlier, blacks are less
likely to have pensions than whites. Second, given that black males do
receive a pension, theyreceivea considerably smaller amountinpension
benef itsthanwhites •Ameasure that combines bothaspectsis the ratio of
expected pension, defined as the ratio of the mean pension times the raw
probabilities from table 6. That number is reported in the fourth column as
.518so pensions appear to exacerbate inequality. (Recall, however, that
results for blacksarenot robust tospecification.) The magnitudes, although
not astronomical, arenot trivial either. Forwhite males, the present value
of pension wealth averages somewhat less than two years' income. For black
males, the average value of pension wealth is somewhat less thanoneyear of
income.
Because of the significant salary differences, conventional plans, which
base the pension on final salary, exacerbate the black/white male differences.
Tables 3 and 4 split the sample of plans intopattern and conventional plans.—23—
The second column of table 5 reports the ratios of means given in table 3 and
the third column reports the ratios of means from table 4,
A comparison of column 3 with column 1 in table 5 reveals that the ratios
in the third column are smaller for all groups that do not include black
females, because salary levels are important for computation of conventional
pension plans, Black males who have conventional plans areateven more of a
disadvantage relative to white males in the same plans because their earnings
are lower, Perhaps more important is that blacks and whites are unlikely to
be found in similar proportions in the two plan types, Pattern plans are more
typical for production workers, whereas the conventional plan is the norm for
management and white—collar workers, To the extent that blacks are over—
represented among pattern plans, pension inequality isevenmore pronounced,
At the extreme, ifallblack males had pattern plans andallwhite males had
conventionalplans, then the ratio of the pension value means would be .456,
whereas salary ratios are .734,
The findings for black females and white females are even more striking,
The salary column of table 5 reveals that theratio of black to white female
salary is .942, whereas the ratio of pension value is only .679. If all white
females were in conventional plan occupations and all black females were in
pattern plan occupations, the pension inequality would be evengreater. That
ratiowould be .628 instead of .679, The reason for the difference is that
conventional plans are generally more lucrative than patternplans, exceptat
very low salary levels, Similarly, the ratio ofexpectedpension for these
groups is .578, implyingeven greater inequality because black females are
lesslikely to be enrolled in apensionplan atall, No matter how wemeasure
it,pensions appear toincrease black/white inequality relative to that
estimatedby salary measures.The male/female comparisons are less clear—cut. Effects go in opposite
directions, As reported above, female workers are less likely to be enrolled
in a pension plan than male workers, but if they are enrolled, the white
females do well relative to their male counterparts The first row of table 5
contains the relevant information, The ratio of final salary of white females
to white males is .635 whereas the ratio of pension values is .776, This
implies an equalizing effect of pension benefits, Part of this results from
the fact that defined-benefit plans are not sex-specific, so that women, with
longer life expectancies, do better than men, But this cannot account for the
large difference between .776 and .635w
The reason why women do so well in pension benefits can best be under-
stood by examining the distinction between pattern and conventional plans.
Note that women are almost on par with men in terms of pension benefits
received in pattern plans, This results from one factor: Pattern plans depend
only on years of service and in that respect, the women who are working at age
55 are quite similar to men, This large value of tenure maps into high
pension flows in the pattern plan. (Because of the actuarial unfairness of
the plan, it could actually have gone the other way, Since tenure levels are
close to comparable, the longer life expectancy of females could have made
their pattern plan pensions worth more than those for males.)
The equalizing effect of pensions is offset almost exactly by the fact
thatfewer men are enrolled in pension plans than men. From table 6, white
menhad a probability of receiving a pension of .608,whereas white women had
aprobability of .482, It is useful, therefore, to compare expected pensions.
The ratio of expected pension for white females to white males is .615 from
the last column of table 5, Thus, pensions leave white female/white male
wealth inequality unaltered,25
Thesame pattern is displayed for blacks. The black female's final
salary is 81% that of black males in this sample and the mean black female's
pension benefit is 92% of the mean black male's pension. But expected pension
ratiostell the opposite story. Since black femalesare much less likely to
bepensionrecipients, the ratio of expected pension benefits is .687. Thus,
pensions increase male/female inequality substantially among blacks,
This conclusion is strengthened somewhat when it is recalled that these
women are not a random sample of the overall population of women. Since a
larger proportion of women will have dropped out of the labor force before
reaching age 55, and since it is likely that those individuals have very small
pension wealth, the numbers presented in the last paragraph tend to understate
the disequalizing effect of pensions in the overall economy.
Other interesting findings are worthy of discussion, Most obviousisthat
there is much more variation in the benefits provided by conventional plans
than in those provided by pattern plans. A comparison of tables 3 and 4 is
instructive, For all four groups, thestandard deviation is much largerfor
conventionalplans. Similarly, with the exception of white males, medians are
about the same across plan types, but the maximum and minimum values are much
moreextreme in the case of conventional plans.
Variance in pension benefits received inconventional plans depends on
twofactors, The first is that for a given salary, companies differ substan-
tially moreintheir conventional pension formulas than intheir pattern plan
formulas,Second, a positive correlationbetweenthe firmas average salary
andgenerosity of the pension formula contributes variance to benefits
received. Although it is conceivable that the two types ofvariation will
offset oneanother, it. is unlikely, There isalreadysomeevidence of a
positivecorrelation between average salary in the firm andthe generosityofpension benefits (see Asch, 1984 and the salary coefficients in table 6).
Before concluding, we should mention that there is another study which
addresses the same questions as we do, but obtains somewhat different results,
McCarthy and Turner (1984) find that blacks actually have higher pensions than
whites do, both in terms of pension flow and pension wealth (see their table
1). They use the Survey of Private Pension Benefit Amounts, a data set that
permits pairing of individuals with the actual pensions they receive, On the
face of it, this data set is superior to those that we have used. But their
findings leave some grounds for doubt on that score. In particular, it is
difficult to believe that blacks have higher pensions than whites because even
in the group of pension plan participants, the average final salary of a black
male is only 63.5% of the white male (see our table 5). Since many pension
plans depend on final salary, even if tenure at retirement did not differ
between groups, the pension flow ratio would mirror the salary ratio, It is
important to reconcile the two sets of results, but McCarthy and Turner are
unable to make their data available to the public, so their results cannot be
replicated.
Conclusion
The existence of pension plans appears to contribute to black/white
inequality, but leaves male/female inequality unchanged among whites, Even
though females are less likely to receive pensions than males, those females
who do receive pensions tend to receive relatively generous ones, Ofcourse,
the average pension that the typical retiring female receives is well below
that received by the typical male retiree, But the difference is not as
pronounced as male/female differences in salary. Among blacks, pensions
exacerbate sex differences, mainly because black women are only about 75% as
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